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“You have large parts of the euro area in what we call a “bad equilibrium”, namely an 
equilibrium where you may have self-fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and 
generate very adverse scenarios.” (ECB President Mario Draghi; 6
th
 September 2012) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 2009, when the debt problems of Greece came to light, the suddenness and magnitude 
of changes in Eurozone bond yield spreads have sparked a debate among economists 
regarding the likely causes. The fundamentalist viewpoint is that the surge in Eurozone yield 
spreads is purely a reflection of deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals. The multiple-
equilibria view contends that markets may not always function optimally and thus, without 
any major change in fiscal fundamentals, the decisions of panic-driven investors may lead a 
country to a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis that otherwise would not have occurred.  
The idea that sovereign members of a currency union are more vulnerable to investor 
sentiment is encapsulated in the “Eurozone fragility hypothesis” (De Grauwe, 2011, 2012). 
The hypothesis states that, by issuing debt in a currency that they cannot control, member 
states are susceptible to a self-fulfilling dynamics fuelled by market sentiment. Panic and fear 
about a sovereign’s defaulting on its debt obligations is likely to trigger sudden stops in 
capital inflows and hence, higher interest rates. The latter make it harder for the sovereign to 
roll over its short-term debt, creating a perverse feedback effect between market sentiment 
and interest rates that could trigger a liquidity crisis and ultimately, the feared default. 
This self-fulfilling dynamics is unlikely to happen in debt markets of sovereigns that 
retain control of their currencies because investors recognize the presence of a central bank 
that, acting as lender-of-last-resort (LOLR), will inject the necessary liquidity in crisis. The 
fragility hypothesis thus sums the idea that such a self-fulfilling dynamics would not be 
present in Eurozone debt markets if the European Central Bank (ECB) takes the LOLR role. 
This paper provides empirical tests of the Eurozone fragility hypothesis from different angles. 
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Mario Draghi announced on July 26, 2012 that the ECB was prepared within its mandate 
to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. Draghi’s announcement gained more meaning a 
few days later on August 2, 2012 when the ECB Governing council declared its intention to 
undertake outright open market operations in secondary government bond markets.
1
 On 
September 6, 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program was formally 
launched, under which the ECB would act as LOLR for countries backed by the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Through this program, the ECB can make purchases or outright 
transactions in the secondary sovereign bond markets of member countries to ease liquidity 
pressures. Conditionality (strict fiscal supervision) is attached to avoid moral hazard and bond 
purchases are fully sterilized to prevent inflationary pressures. Furthermore, the OMT 
program is only activated for a country if, by unanimity among ESM members, its debt is 
deemed sustainable (Wolff, 2014).  
The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether the important change in the ECB’s 
policy stance (signalled by the OMT program) has effectively curbed the self-fulfilling 
dynamics in Eurozone debt markets. Our line of argument builds upon the fact that the OMT 
is neither a form of fiscal distribution among Eurozone members nor a bailout plan. Even if 
markets had initially misinterpreted the speech as a ‘promise’ for solvency support, the 
conditionality attached as part of the requirements of the OMT program rules this out. We 
examine the sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) of 14 countries in Europe as representative 
of the credit risk of ‘periphery’ versus ‘core’ Eurozone countries, as well as European 
countries that have not adopted the euro. This can shed light on the way markets have 
discriminated in terms of sovereign risk pricing between these three groups of countries. We 
provide convincing evidence that the Eurozone debt markets began to anticipate the LOLR 
role of the central bank (that materialized in the OMT program) following Draghi’s 
                                                     
1 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html 
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“whatever-if-takes” pledge on July 26, 2012; hence, we focus on this implicit OMT 
announcement date for most of our analysis and conduct sensitivity analysis later on. 
An eclectic methodology is deployed to test De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis. 
A principal component analysis of daily Eurozone CDS spreads reveals a ‘structural break’ in 
Eurozone sovereign risk perceptions on the (implicit OMT) announcement date. The first and 
second principal components suggest that the announcement increases the commonality in 
sovereign risks of periphery and core Eurozone countries, and marks a change in the way 
markets discriminate among Eurozone members towards a more fundamental-based approach. 
Both a news transmission analysis and a herding contagion analysis conducted at the daily 
frequency produce evidence suggesting that pessimistic self-fulfilling dynamics has been at 
play in Eurozone debt markets; the implicit OMT announcement significantly lessens this 
contagion channel. The news transmission study suggests that the Eurozone contagion 
triggered by news from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria is only present prior to 
the announcement. The herding contagion analysis reveals frequent occurrences of 
simultaneous adverse shocks to the CDS spreads precisely of those same countries that were 
identified as exhibiting significant news contagion effects but again only pre-announcement.  
The findings support De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis and the underlying multiple-
equilibria theory of the crisis. The latter does not overlook the importance of fundamentals but 
adds that, in times of massive economic adjustment, panic amplifies exogenous shocks and 
can push an otherwise solvent country toward default. Our findings suggest that there is more 
to the recent Eurozone debt crisis than a strong link between credit spreads and fundamentals.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section outlines the relevant background 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. The empirical results are presented 
in section 4.  Section 5 discusses various policy implications and concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review 
Our paper is motivated by theoretical multiple-equilibria models that predict that 
fundamentals matter to the extent that countries with sound and weak fundamentals would 
incur a single outcome, default or no default, respectively, while multiple equilibria can 
happen for countries with similar fundamentals that lie in between these two poles (Calvo, 
1988; De Grauwe, 2012; Gros, 2012; Corsetti & Dedola, 2013). Thus, the multiple-equilibria 
theory does not preclude increased sensitivity to fundamentals such as fiscal space and public 
debt ratios in the run-up to the Eurozone debt crisis but rather it contends that they are not the 
whole story (Aizenman et al., 2013; Grauwe & Ji, 2013). It is well known that peripheral 
Eurozone countries suffered dramatic rises in their CDS spreads (during the pre-OMT period) 
compared with non-euro European countries with similar fundamentals; clearly, this leaves a 
role for self-fulfilling dynamics in the absence of a lender-of-last-resort.  
Our paper relates to a burgeoning literature on the recent European sovereign debt crisis 
that provides evidence on ‘contagion’ broadly construed (with many nuances) as cross-
country linkages driven by market expectations that are somewhat divorced from 
fundamentals. Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) document herding contagion or cross-country 
clustering of adverse shocks that cannot be traced to fundamentals. Likewise, De Grauwe & Ji 
(2013) show that a substantial part of the simultaneous rise in credit spreads of Eurozone 
countries was driven by market sentiment of panic and fear. Aizenman et al. (2013) show that 
Eurozone periphery default risk was overpriced in 2010 relative to that of non-euro ‘matched’ 
countries (i.e., similar countries in terms of fiscal space) and provide as one of two alternative 
explanations that the mispricing was due to a wave of contagious pessimism or a “bad” self-
fulfilling expectational equilibrium. Alter & Beyer (2013) provide evidence of cross-country 
links in CDS spreads after controlling for exogenous common factors, while Beetsma et al. 
(2013), De Santis (2014) find contagion from Greece to other Eurozone member countries. 
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A parallel literature argues that investors became more sensitive to fundamentals during 
the crisis, a phenomenon that has been often formalized as “wake up calls” or fundamental 
contagion (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013 
and Manasse & Zavalloni, 2013; Mink & De Haan, 2013). In a similar vein, an alternative 
more fundamentals-based explanation provided in Aizenman et al. (2013) for their findings is 
that the CDS market prices the risk of default not only on current but also future fundamentals 
which were expected to worsen for Eurozone periphery countries due to the adjustment 
challenges faced given their exchange rate and monetary constrains. Our paper adds to these 
studies by comparing the dynamics of Eurozone debt markets over two short length (12-
month) windows that differ in an incontestable fact – while members of the common currency 
faced similar fiscal problems, exchange rate and monetary constraints in both windows, only 
in the post-OMT announcement window the ECB assumed the LOLR role. This important 
change in the ECB policy stance ought to restrain the dramatic rises in credit spreads in the 
region only if these had a significant self-fulfilling dynamics component (De Grauwe, 2011).  
Finally, our research is related to a stream of the literature that tests the effects of 
unconventional ECB policies on the market-priced risks of sovereign debt. For instance, De 
Pooter et al. (2013) find significant stock and flow effects on sovereign bonds’ liquidity risk 
resulting from ECB bond purchases under the Security Markets Program (SMP). Similarly, 
Eser and Schwaab (2013) show that the SMP program had a long-lasting impact on the 
sovereign bond yields of periphery Eurozone countries. Likewise, Ghysels et al. (2014) 
conclude that the SMP was effective in reducing both the level and volatility of bond yield 
spreads. Some recent studies found similarly depressing effects in the context of the OMT 
programme (Falagiarda & Reitz, 2013; Altavilla et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2014). 
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3. Data description and preliminary analysis 
3.1. Sovereign CDS spreads 
The analysis is based on daily midpoint closing spread quotes on 5-year sovereign credit 
default swap (CDS) contracts from January 1, 2008 to July 25, 2013 from Datastream. The 
CDS contracts pertain to four Eurozone ‘periphery’ countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain), six Eurozone ‘core’ countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands), and four European countries that are not members of the euro currency union 
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK). Following the literature, recent Eurozone members 
(such as Latvia) and other economically small countries (such as Estonia, Slovakia, Malta and 
Slovenia) are excluded from the periphery (see, for instance, Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; 
Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013; De Santis, 2014; Beetsma et al., 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013, 
2014). We conjecture that the exclusion of Greece, due to lack of CDS data from March 2012, 
is immaterial given that the systemic importance of Greece lessens notably in the most recent 
years (Alter & Beyer, 2014; González-Hermosillo & Johnson, 2014). This conjecture is later 
substantiated through a sensitivity analysis using bond yield data. 
CDS prices are arguably more informative than bond yields for various reasons. Firstly, 
sovereign CDS data are more liquid and allow more accurate and timely estimates of credit 
risks (see, e.g., Ang & Longstaff, 2013 and Aizenman et al., 2013). In addition, CDS spreads 
are recognized as a more direct measure of default risk than bond yield spreads as they are not 
affected by differences in contractual arrangements, contract-specific liquidity effects, 
inflation expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions; see, e.g., Longstaff et al. 
(2011) and Aizenman et al. (2013). Nevertheless, as noted above, we employ bond yield 
spreads as another proxy for sovereign risk in various robustness checks. 
The evolution of daily CDS spreads in Figure 1 shows that an upward trend of pessimism 
in peripheral Eurozone credit risk erupts around March 2010 when Greece was first rescued. 
A marked downward trend in CDS spreads is observed after July 26, 2012 when Mario 
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Draghi stated that the ECB was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. This 
is the main event in our study (referred to as the implicit OMT announcement) because 
although the actual announcement of the OMT program took place barely a month later, it has 
been argued that Draghi’s pledge effectively signalled the new stance of the ECB as LOLR in 
Eurozone sovereign debt markets (Krugman, 2013; Pisani-Ferry, 2013).  
Table 1 summarises the distribution of CDS premiums in basis points over the 12-month 
window preceding the (implicit OMT) announcement, Panel A, and the 12-month post-
announcement window, Panel B; the last column shows the change in CDS spreads. The level 
and volatility of CDS spreads notably rise during the pre-announcement period; Ireland and 
Portugal are plausible exceptions since they both received bailout packages earlier on.
2
 The 
CDS spreads of all countries exhibit an overall decrease in the post-announcement window. 
As part of our preliminary data analysis, we regress the CDS spreads on macroeconomic 
fundamentals using quarterly data pooled across the 10 Eurozone countries. Our focus is on 
four key ratios often used in studies of the Eurozone debt crisis: Debt/GDP which measures 
the country’s government debt relative to GDP (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 
2012; Beirne & Fratzcher, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013, 2014), Budget/GDP or the relative 
government budget balance (Caceres et al., 2010; Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Beirne & 
Fratzcher, 2013; De Santis, 2014), Debt/Tax or ‘fiscal space’ defined as government debt 
relative to tax base averaged over the previous five years to account for business cycle 
fluctuations (Aizenman et al., 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013), and Current Account/GDP or 
current account balance cumulated from 2009:Q4 divided by the GDP level (Beirne & 
Fratzcher, 2013; De Grauwe & Ji, 2013, 2014). Figure 2 shows scatterplots and corresponding 
regression lines pre- and post-announcement which clearly reveal various outliers defined as 
the country-quarter CDS spreads that were most misaligned with fundamentals. 
                                                     
2 Ireland and Portugal were bailed out on November 22, 2010 and May 16, 2011, respectively. 
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The outliers thus identified pertain to the Eurozone periphery (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) and are only observed in the pre-announcement period. In the lower panel of Figure 2, 
excluding Portugal and Ireland (under the premise that their bailouts may have diluted the link 
of their CDS spreads with fundamentals), the outliers pertain to Spain and Italy. The pooled 
OLS regression results in Table 2 further confirm that fundamentals played a significant role 
as drivers of CDS spreads in both periods but their explanatory power is stronger post-
announcement. These findings constitute evidence that the implicit OMT announcement may 
have helped the Eurozone debt markets to coordinate on a more fundamental-based 
equilibrium. We further investigate this conjecture in the next sections. 
3.2. Commonality in credit risks of Eurozone sovereigns 
We conduct a principal component analysis of daily CDS spreads over the two-year sample 
period around the implicit OMT announcement. Following Longstaff et al. (2011) and 
Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012), we interpret the first two principal components (hereafter, 
PC1 and PC2) as common risk factors. PC1 represents a Eurozone sovereign risk factor 
broadly defined as an equal-weighted average of country CDS spreads; thus, the loadings 
capture the systemic contribution of each sovereign. PC2 represents the divergence among 
core and periphery countries; a negative (positive) loading indicates a core (periphery) 
country. This divergence amounts to the risk differential from investing in periphery versus 
core bonds which Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012) link with the notion of ‘contagion’ through 
a default domino effect and the increased probability of aggregating fiscal risks.  
As Table 3 shows, in the pre- announcement window the two components PC1 and PC2 
explain together about 75% of the total variation in Eurozone CDS spreads, and the 
explanatory power of PC2 is 20%. Post-announcement, the two factors capture 96% of the 
total variation, and the contribution of PC2 falls to 5%. However, this increased commonality 
across Eurozone spreads cannot be attributed to a convergence trend among these countries’ 
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fundamentals in the post-announcement window since such a trend did not occur (see Figure 
A1 in on-line Appendix). A better interpretation is that there were additional unobserved risk 
factors (i.e., self-fulfilling dynamics) in the region which the announcement served to contain. 
The contribution of Ireland and Portugal to Eurozone credit risk in the pre-announcement 
period is small as suggested by respective PC1 loadings of 0.097 and 0.020. This result aligns 
well with our previous finding (Table 1) that Ireland and Portugal are the only two Eurozone 
countries that experienced an overall pre-announcement decline in CDS spreads as a result of 
earlier EU/IMF bailout programs which altered investors’ risk perceptions. A similar 
conclusion is reached by Alter & Beyer (2014) albeit from a different methodology. The 
loadings of PC2 also provide interesting reading. Before the announcement, markets clearly 
discriminated against countries such as Spain and Italy but perceived Portugal and Ireland 
more favourably. Post-OMT announcement, the positive loadings of Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Ireland indicate that investors classify them together again alongside Belgium and France.  
The dynamics of the two principal components in Figure 3 informally suggests a ‘break’ at 
the implicit OMT announcement date on July 26, 2012 which is confirmed by formal tests; 
thus, investors begin by then to anticipate the LOLR stance symbolized by the OMT program 
soon after.
3
  PC1 and PC2 exhibit distinct behaviour pre- and post-announcement. PC1 
swings wildly around a high plateau pre-announcement and stabilizes at a much lower level 
post-announcement. This further suggests that the announcement serves to restrain 
overreaction and mispricing of Eurozone credit risks. PC2 exhibits a steep upward trend in the 
first half of 2012, echoing investors’ perception of growing divergence (‘periphery’ versus 
‘core’) in Eurozone credit risk. The OMT announcement marks the beginning of a reversal. 
                                                     
3
 More formally, the Chow breakpoint test reveals a significant change in the conditional mean (level) 
of PC1 and PC2 on the day of the implicit OMT announcement (July 26, 2012); however, the evidence 
of a break on September 6, 2012 is relatively weaker as the test only suggests a break in the mean level 
of PC1 but not of PC2. Detailed results are tabulated in Table A1 in the on-line Appendix. 
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4. Empirical results  
4.1. Spain-news transmission 
In this section we conduct an event study to assess the impact of news specific to a “troubled” 
Eurozone country on other Eurozone member countries and on non-euro (or standalone) 
European countries; a similar approach has been adopted in extant studies of contagion such 
as Mink & De Haan (2013). The first task then is to choose a periphery country as the main 
contagion source over the entire sample period under study from July 26, 2011 to July 25, 
2013. Greece, Portugal and Ireland are ruled out since they received rescue packages at earlier 
stages and hence, lost their capacity to generate contagion later on (Alter & Beyer, 2014; 
González-Hermosillo & Johnson, 2014). Spain is a good candidate since it experiences the 
peak of its debt problems during the sample period (its CDS spreads peaked 2 days before the 
implicit OMT announcement) and the Eurozone core versus periphery contagion factor (PC2) 
loadings reveal that Spain is perceived as the riskiest country before the announcement.  
In order construct a Spain-specific news variable (ܰ݁ݓݏ௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡), a key input in the event-
study analysis, we identify the days of most salient events though the OLS regression 
  	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚሺ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧ሻ + ݑௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ (1) 
where 	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ denotes the daily change in the Spanish CDS spread, ΔEuropeant is the 
daily change in a European sovereign risk index constructed as an average of the CDS spreads 
of the remaining 9 Eurozone countries and 4 non-euro European countries in the sample, and ݎ௙,௧ is the ECB’s daily Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rate from Datastream.  We 
estimate the model, which can be broadly perceived as a CAPM benchmark, separately over 
the pre- and post- announcement windows using the OLS method and examine the residuals.
4
  
                                                     
4 Innovations to Spanish CDS spreads might influence other countries’ spreads but it is unlikely that 
they can drive the entire European index; thus, endogeneity does not represent a serious concern here. 
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We identify the 10 days in each window (pre- and post-OMT announcement) that show the 
largest (absolute) residuals |ݑ|ௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ and relate those days to news from Reuters and 
Bloomberg Businessweek that may have caused the unexpected CDS change. This residual 
approach mitigates the possibility of ‘event contamination’ by market-wide (i.e., Eurozone) 
shocks since it identifies the Spain-specific event dates as days when the actual change in the 
Spanish CDS premium deviates substantially from the expected (CAPM-based) change. 
Table 4 shows the 10 most salient Spain-specific events thus identified in each window and 
associated news; the symbols R (Reuters) and B (Bloomberg) indicate the news source. 
Building upon the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis, we assume that a 
large residual on any day reflects news arriving on that day; that is, the CDS premium quickly 
incorporates all public information. Of course, the Reuters or Bloomberg Businessweek news 
may not always represent the actual underlying causes of significant market movements. Yet 
it provides a good approximation of what the average or representative investor might think 
about the important events of each day and about their potential effects on debt markets (Mink 
& De Haan, 2013). The discrete Spanish-news variable is constructed as  ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ =݀௧ ∗ ݑො௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡ where ݀௧ is equal to 1 on the salient news dates and 0 elsewhere.  
Next we estimate by OLS the following CAPM type model to measure the news contagion 
 ∆ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߚሺ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧ሻ + ߙ଴ + ߙଵܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ (2) 
where ∆ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ is the daily change in the Eurozone country ith CDS spread, and ߝ௜,௧ is an 
innovation; ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ and ݎ௙,௧ are as defined after equation (1). The parameter of interest, ߙଵ, captures the responsiveness of CDS spread changes in country i to news specific to the 
Spanish economy (contagion from Spain); ߙ௧ ≡ ߙ଴ + ߙଵܰ݁ݓݏ௧ is a time-varying abnormal 
return that captures the model’s mispricing; the European risk factor loading,	ߚ, measures the 
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sensitivity of the ith country CDS premium to the European CDS premium. Table 5 shows he 
estimation results over the pre- and post-OMT announcement windows.
5
   
In the pre-OMT announcement window, the Spanish-news impact is positive for Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands although insignificant so for the latter. The 
strongest Spanish-news impact is found for Italy, in line with extant evidence of co-
movements of Spanish and Italian debt spreads (e.g., González-Hermosillo & Johnson, 2014). 
These results suggest that pre-announcement, investors’ perception of the creditworthiness of 
other Eurozone countries is tainted by Spanish news. This evidence is consistent with our 
early findings from the principal component analysis. In contrast, the Spanish-news 
coefficient for Portugal and Ireland is negative which confirms that the epicentre of the crisis 
had moved away from them, namely, investors’ perception had shifted favourably towards 
countries that had applied strict austerity measures relative to the new ‘strugglers’ that were 
resisting those actions. Post-announcement, no significantly positive Spanish-news coefficient 
is obtained and thus, there is no news transmission from the troubled Spanish sovereign bond 
market to any other Eurozone bond market.
6
 How do we explain the significant lessening in 
the Spanish news contagion effects before and after the implicit OMT announcement?  
Under the premise that the ECB “whatever-it-takes” pledge was most credibly interpreted 
by investors as a hint of the bank’s intention to act as LOLR (not as some form of fiscal 
redistribution or a bailout plan), our explanation is that there was self-fulfilling dynamics in 
the region. If the news transmission had been purely a wake-up call (i.e., news about Spain 
                                                     
5
 Inspired by Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012), we estimate the country-specific CAPM equation (2) 
without the Spain-news variable but expanded with PC2 as a proxy for contagion within the 
Eurozone. For none of the countries the PC2 coefficient is significant post-OMT. The only contagion 
effect pre-OMT is revealed for Spain (a significantly positive coefficient at the 1% level) which 
confirms the role played by this country as contagion-source; see Table A9 of the on-line Appendix. 
6
 We assess the significance of the news impact differential (ܪ଴: ߙଵ௣௥௘ = ߙଵ௣௢௦௧	vs	ܪ஺: ߙଵ௣௥௘ > ߙଵ௣௢௦௧Ͳሻ	with 
an F test statistic. To do so, we estimate the CAPM benchmark equation (2) including the two dummy 
variables ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧௣௥௘  and ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧௣௢௦௧  (pre- and post-announcement Spanish news, respectively) as 
regressors. The null is strongly rejected at the 1% significance level, as shown in Table A2 of the on-
line Appendix, for Austria, Belgium, France and Italy. 
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prompting investors to closely pay attention to other countries’ fundamentals) then one would 
not expect the OMT to have such calming down effect on the news transmission. 
CDS spreads of Eurozone member countries respond to (generally) adverse Spain-specific 
news but not necessarily because of the information content about their own current or future 
fundamentals; if this was the reason then the effect ought to have been present both pre- and 
post-announcement. The news transmission occurred most likely because, in the absence of a 
LOLR, investors’ panic and fear channelled the markets toward a ‘bad’ equilibrium. 
Moreover, the finding of insignificant Spanish-news transmission for stand-alone countries 
(e.g., Denmark and UK, as shown in Table 6) further strengthens the evidence in favour of the 
Eurozone fragility hypothesis as it proves that the phenomenon was specific to members of 
the currency union. In the next section, we test the fragility hypothesis from a different angle. 
4.2 Herding effects 
Following Beirne & Fratzscher (2013) and De Grauwe & Ji (2013) among others, our analysis 
of herding effects builds upon the notion that a simultaneous rise in sovereign CDS premiums 
that cannot be explained by common risk factors represents a “debt run” against the particular 
group of countries. Such phenomenon is commonly interpreted as reflecting contagion 
through unobservables such as herding due to investor sentiments of panic and fear. 
We analyze the clustering of large unexplained changes in the pricing of sovereign risk 
(i.e., herding effect) through OLS estimation of the following CAPM type equation  
 ∆ܥܦ 	ܵ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚሺ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧ሻ + ߝ	௜,௧ (3) 
using daily data over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement; the 
estimation is carried out per country ݅ = ͳ,… . , ܰ (ܰ = ͳ4) which produces N distributions of 
daily residuals, ߝ௜̂,௧ , ݐ = ͳ,… . , ܶ (ܶ=523 residuals). Our focus is on the right-tail of the 
distribution, that is, the most extreme positive residuals (i.e., unexpected CDS spread changes 
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above those explained by the European risk factor) defined using the 20th or 10
th
 percentile 
rule. The herding contagion index is conservatively defined on each day of the sample period 
as the proportion of countries with extreme positive residuals if this proportion exceeds 80% 
(i.e. clustering of extreme bad news) and zero otherwise. 
Based on our findings from the principal components decomposition of CDS spreads and 
the Spain-news transmission analysis, the sample countries are allocated to three groups; a 
‘contagion’ set comprising Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain; a ‘non-contagion’ set 
comprising Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal; and a non-euro set (or 
control group) with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. According to De Grauwe’s 
Eurozone fragility hypothesis, the market perception of creditworthiness of these stand-alone 
countries cannot be tainted by self-fulfilling dynamics precisely because they retain sovereign 
control over their own currencies; namely, they have a superior force of last resort (their 
central bank) that prevents investors from precipitating a liquidity crisis (De Grauwe, 2011). 
Figure 4 shows the daily herding contagion indices for all three groups of countries.  
As for the ‘contagion’ group, we identify a large number of days with simultaneous large 
unexpected changes in the pricing of sovereign risk preceding the implicit OMT 
announcement. However, even with the lenient 20
th
 percentile rule, only three such clusters 
are identified post-announcement, and two of them occur on the days immediately before the 
formal OMT announcement on September 6, 2012 so they would not have qualified as post-
announcement herding days had the formal OMT announcement been adopted as threshold to 
define the windows. The strict 10
th
 percentile rule produces similar findings. In contrast, for 
the ‘non-contagion’ set and the non-euro set, we identify less than a handful of days with 
herding in both the pre- and post-announcement windows.  
A formal Chow type test suggests that the mean level of the daily herding index for the 
‘contagion’ Eurozone set is significantly higher (at the 1% level) in the pre-announcement 
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window than post-announcement; detailed results are shown in Table A3 of the on-line 
Appendix. Thus, herding (or fear-driven) contagion afflicted several Eurozone debt markets 
before, but not after, the implicit OMT announcement; these findings, in conjunction with our 
previous analysis, endorse De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis.
7
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
This section discusses additional estimations and tests. We begin by adopting a pricing 
equation which is more in the spirit of the arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976; APT). This is 
the route taken also by empirical studies that employ market indices as proxies for unobserved 
sources of commonality among sovereigns (e.g., Bekaert et al., 2011; Manasse & Zavalloni, 
2013). Accordingly, we estimate the following pricing equation with daily data 
                	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ൫∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯+ߚଶ൫∆ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯  
             +ߚଷ൫∆ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ݑௌ௣௔௜௡,௧                                           (4) 
where the betas ሺߚଵ, ߚଶ, ߚଷሻ measure the sensitivity of the country’s spreads to three common 
risk factors: one for European sovereigns, a second for financial intermediaries, and a third 
one for global sovereigns. ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ is as defined after equation (1), ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ௧ is the 
Markit iTraxx Senior Financials index based on the 25 most liquid CDS reference entities for 
senior debt issued by European financial firms, and ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ is an equally-weighted average 
of CDS spreads of the same 26 (non-European) sovereigns as in Longstaff et al. (2011) that 
proxies global sovereign credit risk. The data are sourced from Datastream.  
                                                     
7 Our focus is on the unexpected movements in sovereign CDS spreads that are driven by ‘bad’ news 
(the right-tail of the residual distribution) because De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis in the context of 
the recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis goes hand-in-hand with market sentiments of panic and fear 
(De Grauwe, 2011, 2012). However, more generally, self-fulfilling dynamics applies in both directions; 
the multiple-equilibria theory rationalizes both contagious pessimism and contagious optimism. In a 
robustness check we construct herding contagion indices pertaining to good news (left-tail of 
residuals) as shown in Figure A2 of the on-line Appendix; the results confirm our main findings. 
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As in the preceding analysis (reported in Section 4.1) we estimate the pricing model, 
separately, over the one-year windows before and after the implicit OMT announcement, in 
order to identify salient Spain-specific news dates. Once those event dates are identified we 
re-construct the discrete Spain news variable ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ and estimate the contagion model 
	∆ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߚଵ൫∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߚଶ൫∆ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + 																																																		+ߚଷ൫∆ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯+ߙ଴ + ߙଵܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ (5) 
where the relevant coefficient that captures contagion from Spain is ߙଵ. The estimation results 
in Table 5 show a significantly positive news coefficient for Italy, Belgium, as with the 
CAPM, but also for France and Austria providing somewhat stronger evidence of news 
transmission from Spain to these two countries. The difference in the pre- and post-
announcement news coefficients of these countries (Ho: ߙଵ௣௥௘ − ߙଵ௣௢௦௧ = Ͳ) is strongly 
significant according to an F test statistic; detailed results are provided in Table A2 of the on-
line Appendix. Likewise, the unreported herding contagion indexes derived from the APT 
benchmark with three common risk factors, instead of equation (3), did not challenge our 
previous findings; the results are reported in Figure A3 in the on-line Appendix. 
In another robustness check we compare shorter (6-month as opposed to 12-month) 
windows around the implicit OMT announcement. The pre-announcement period is from 
January 26, 2012 to July 25, 2012, and the post-announcement period from July 27, 2012 to 
January 25, 2013. These shorter windows allow less room for changes in fundamental 
channels of cross-country credit risk transmission such as trade or financial links and hence, 
permit us to assess in a more ‘sterilized’ manner the impact of the implicit OMT 
announcement. We focus now on the 5 most salient event dates (instead of 10) in each period 
owing to the shorter periods.  The results summarized in Table 7 confirm that the contagion 
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from Spain news to the CDS premiums of other Eurozone countries (e.g., Italy and Belgium) 
unambiguously loses significance after the implicit OMT announcement. 
Next we re-deploy the different approaches (principal components, Spain-news 
transmission and herding effects) by adopting as “announcement date” the day of the formal 
OMT announcement on September 6, 2012. The results summarized in Figures A4 and A5, 
and Table A4 of the on-line Appendix do not change our main findings.  
Next, we generalize the Spain-news transmission and herding contagion analysis to a 
setting that allows for time variation in the common risk factor loadings (the beta coefficients 
in the benchmark). Thus, we estimate by OLS the CAPM and APT pricing equations 
sequentially over rolling estimation windows. The event indicator ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ is obtained as 
follows; the residual for day t is obtained as the difference between the actual CDS change on 
that day and the expected CDS change for that day according to the pricing model estimated 
over the corresponding rolling window (spanning a one-year period of 261 days). The 
window is then rolled forward one day to obtain the residual for day t+1 and so forth. The 
results from this analysis make no material difference to the news identification; in fact, about 
90% of the dates thus detected are listed in Table 4. It is also reassuring to see that the 
evidence of herding contagion does not materially change when we sequentially estimate the 
CAPM benchmark over rolling windows. Detailed results are provided in Table A5 (Spain-
news identification) and Figure A6 (herding effects) of the on-line Appendix.  
In a final robustness check we analyze bond yield spreads defined, as it is usual, with 
reference to Germany. Detailed results are provided in the on-line Appendix; Figure A7 and 
Tables A6-A7 summarize the principal components analysis. Figure A8 and Table A8 show, 
respectively, the herding contagion indices and F tests for the significance of the change in 
herding pre- and post-announcement. These analyses include Greece as periphery Eurozone 
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country. The findings are robust to using different measures of sovereign credit risk and the 
exclusion of Greece from the sample period due to lack of CDS spreads data is immaterial. 
5. Summary and policy implications 
The turmoil in Eurozone debt markets that erupted more than five years ago revived an old 
debate. Fundamental theorists blame periphery countries’ deteriorating fundamentals. 
However, without denying the role of fundamentals, multiple-equilibria theorists argue that a 
self-fulfilling dynamics fuelled by market sentiments of fear and panic has been at play in the 
region pushing countries towards a worse equilibrium than is justified by fundamentals alone.  
In the spirit of the multiple-equilibria discourse, De Grauwe (2011) articulates the 
Eurozone fragility hypothesis which states that countries that have adopted the euro are prone 
to sudden reversals in capital flows triggered by market sentiment of fear which can 
ultimately trigger the feared default. This self-fulfilling dynamics is unlikely to occur in the 
US, UK or Japan because the financial markets know that these countries have a central bank 
acting as lender-of-last resort (LOLR). Absent the latter, the Eurozone member countries are 
in essence like “emerging countries” issuing debt in a foreign currency; thus, their credit risk 
spreads can be subject to self-fulfilling dynamics that misaligns them with fundamentals.  
ECB President Mario Draghi announces on July 26, 2012 that the ECB is prepared within 
its mandate to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro; a month later, the ECB introduces 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program that represents the lender-of-last resort 
stance. In response to German Eurosceptics’ protests against the legality of the OMT 
program, the German Constitutional Court on February 2014 passes the case to the European 
Court of Justice. Our paper contributes to making an informed judgment on this matter. 
It provides empirical evidence that supports De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis 
by showing, through an eclectic methodology subject to various robustness checks, that the 
sovereign debt crisis afflicting many Eurozone countries should be ascribed to more than 
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fundamentals. A principal component analysis of Eurozone CDS spreads suggests that their 
commonality increases post-announcement. The link between Eurozone fundamentals and 
CDS spreads is found to increase post-announcement. The transmission of news about Spain 
and herding contagion significantly lessen after the announcement. 
These findings suggest that a self-fulfilling dynamics was present in Eurozone debt 
markets and Draghi’s implicit OMT announcement served to contain it. This policy stance of 
the ECB has helped not only ‘periphery’ members (such as Italy and Spain) but also ‘core’ 
members (such as Belgium and France) that are struggling to restore their economies to their 
pre-crisis state, even as their southern neighbours face the risk of deflation and stagnation.  
In suggesting that fundamentals are not the whole story, our findings challenge the ‘you-
deserve-what-you-get’ attitude of advocates of strict austerity programs. Our findings stress 
the institutional role that the ECB plays in preventing debt runs in the region. A positive 
(albeit not sufficient) step in addressing the Eurozone structural fragility is the unanimous 
political backing by its members of the ECB’s role as a lender of last resort. However, further 
structural reforms at supranational level such as a fiscal union possibly with centralized 
taxation and redistribution power are also crucial to fully overcome such fragility. 
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Figure 1. Daily sovereign CDS spreads from December 5, 2008 to July 25, 2013 
Panel A: Peripheral Eurozone countries
 
Panel B: Core Eurozone countries 
 
Panel C: Stand-alone European countries 
 
Note: The graphs show the daily evolution of the CDS spreads (in basis points) of 10 Eurozone countries 
distinguished as ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’, and four non-euro European countries. The first vertical line on March 
31, 2010 marks the date of the first rescue package for Greece. The second vertical line on July 26, 2012 marks the 
date of ECB President Mario Draghi’s statement that the Bank was prepared to do “whatever it takes to preserve 
the euro”; this paper refers to this date as the implicit Outright Monetary Transactions program (OMT) 
announcement. The third vertical line marks the formal OMT announcement on September 6, 2012. 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots and OLS regression line for Eurozone CDS spreads versus macro fundamentals from mid-2011 to mid-2013  
 
Note: The four graphs in the upper panel are based on pooled quarterly observations for 10 Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and the ones in the lower panel are for the same set of countries excluding Ireland and Portugal. The Y-axis represents the quarterly CDS 
spreads and the X-axis represents the corresponding macroeconomic indicators of these countries over the two-year period from mid-2011 to mid-2013. 
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Figure 3. First and second principal components of daily Eurozone CDS spreads 
 
Note: The first and second principal components plotted are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily CDS 
spreads over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement (on July 26, 2012; vertical 
dashed line) that commences on July 26, 2011 and ends on July 25, 2013. The CDS spreads pertain to 10 Eurozone 
countries, of which 4 are ‘peripheral’ countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 6 are ‘core’ countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) according to the standard classification. 
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Figure 4. Herding contagion index  
Panel A: 20th-percentile rule               Panel B: 10th-percentile rule                  
 
Contagion Eurozone countries Non-contagion Eurozone countries  Stand-alone countries 
 
Note:  The graph plots on each day of the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement (July 26, 2012; vertical dotted line) the herding contagion index. The 
index is defined as the proportion of CDS spreads that experienced unexpected extreme increases in their CDS spreads according to the CAPM benchmark, equation (3), if this 
exceeds 80%, and zero otherwise; extreme is defined according to the 20th percentile or 10th percentile criteria applied to the residual distribution. The residuals are obtained 
through OLS estimation. The ‘contagion’ Eurozone countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain; the ‘non-contagion Eurozone countries are Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. The stand-alone (non-euro) countries are Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads of European countries 
 Panel A: Pre- announcement 
(July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2012) 
 Panel B: Post- announcement 
(July 26, 2012 to July 25, 2013) 
 Average StDev. Min. Max. ∆CDS Average StDev. Min. Max. ∆CDS 
Periphery Eurozone countries 
Ireland 696.76 110.06 522.25 973.43 - 370.31 222.95 97.65 142.39 550.71 - 401.40 
Italy 452.92 68.16 271.88 586.70 276.63 288.96 63.31 221.96 515.71 - 257.80 
Portugal 1133.30 145.71 781.71 1601.00 - 125.39 453.77 120.28 269.42 881.56 - 465.33 
Spain 435.54 78.32 314.91 634.35 294.89 306.69 80.52 213.72 583.56 - 332.86 
Core Eurozone countries  
Austria 164.72 28.42 86.91 236.13 50.47 50.92 21.12 31.60 127.89 - 94.11 
Belgium 260.92 40.15 175.76 398.78 26.14 88.32 31.10 54.66 191.44 - 128.39 
Finland 70.63 8.95 44.34 87.24 15.54 31.85 7.13 22.02 57.57 - 35.55 
France 184.25 24.23 112.23 245.27 66.34 88.18 22.54 57.11 168.47 - 97.27 
Germany 88.00 11.97 59.97 118.38 20.43 39.45 10.88 22.85 75.82 - 47.36 
Netherlands 103.13 16.58 52.19 133.84 41.82 54.61 10.24 37.98 89.43 - 37.97 
Non-Eurozone countries 
Denmark 117.54 15.23 65.31 157.46 32.04 38.27 16.46 24.50 93.44 - 68.94 
Norway 36.15 8.47 20.84 52.11 4.15 19.76 3.10 15.28 30.96 - 15.40 
Sweden 58.71 10.29 32.69 84.23 19.77 23.61 7.27 17.04 50.99 - 30.63 
United Kingdom 78.25 11.53 58.66 101.64 - 10.24 44.85 7.38 27.60 58.41 - 20.34 
Notes: The table summarizes the distribution of daily sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) of 14 European countries over the two yearly windows surrounding the implicit 
OMT announcement on July 26, 2012. ∆CDS denotes the change in the CDS spread from the initial day to the last day of the corresponding window.  
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Table 2. Pooled OLS regressions of quarterly CDS spreads on fundamentals  
 Pre-announcement  
(mid 2011 to  mid 2012) 
 Post- announcement:  
(mid 2012 to mid 2013) 
 t-statistic Adj.ܴଶ  t-statistic Adj.ܴଶ 
Debt/GDP 3.48** 0.35  5.59** 0.49 
Budget/GDP -2.39* 0.13  -4.75** 0.37 
Debt/Tax 1.91 0.05  3.10** 0.28 
Current 
Account/GDP 
-3.43** 0.46 
 
-4.79** 0.51 
Notes: The table reports the OLS slope coefficient estimates of regressions of CDS spreads on four macro 
indicators in the one-year windows before and after the implicit OMT announcement on July 26, 2012. The 
estimation is based on pooled quarterly data for 10 Eurozone countries. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
robust Newey-West t-statistics are reported. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Principal component decomposition of daily Eurozone CDS spreads 
   Eigenvalues Total variation 
explained (%) 
Country loadings (eigenvectors) 
           PC1                          PC2 
Panel A: Pre-announcement (July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2012) 
PC1 5.646 56.46 Austria 0.385 -0.025
PC2 1.877 75.22 Belgium 0.320 -0.398
PC3 1.253 87.76 Finland 0.346 0.040
PC4 0.470 92.46 France 0.405 -0.037
PC5 0.334 95.80 Germany 0.368 -0.109
PC6 0.229 98.09 Ireland 0.020 -0.533
PC7 0.072 98.81 Italy 0.368 0.095
PC8 0.057 99.38 Netherlands 0.377 0.162
PC9 0.034 99.72 Portugal 0.097 -0.449
PC10 0.028 100.00 Spain 0.208 0.552
Panel B: Post-announcement (July 26, 2012 to July 25, 2013) 
PC1 9.148 91.48 Austria 0.328 -0.025
PC2 0.450 95.98 Belgium 0.328 0.039
PC3 0.223 98.21 Finland 0.322 -0.135
PC4 0.070 98.91 France 0.325 0.004
PC5 0.044 99.35 Germany 0.310 -0.344
PC6 0.028 99.63 Ireland 0.327 0.056
PC7 0.014 99.77 Italy 0.320 0.106
PC8 0.011 99.89 Netherlands 0.282 -0.628
PC9 0.007 99.96 Portugal 0.294 0.613
PC10 0.004 100.00 Spain 0.323 0.276
Notes: The table reports eigenvalues λj, j=1,…,10 and the proportion of the total variation in CDS spreads of 10 
Eurozone countries that is explained by each principal component given by λj/Σλj. The last two columns report 
the eigenvectors or country loadings to construct the first and second principal components (denoted PC1 and 
PC2, respectively). The principal components are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily sovereign CDS 
spreads over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement (on July 26, 2012). The 
principal components are summarized, separately, over the two yearly windows surrounding the implicit OMT 
announcement. The 10 Eurozone countries are 4 ‘peripheral’ (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 6 ‘core’ 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) according to the standard classification. 
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Table 4. Spain-specific daily news 
Date News Description Residual (%) ∆CDS (%) 
Panel A: Pre-announcement (July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2012)    
10.08.2011 Spain’s Banca Civica BCIV.MC said on Wednesday its non-performing loan ratio at the end of the first half was 
5.43 percent compared to 4.70 percent at the end of 2010 (R). 
5.77 11.34 
23.08.2011 An agreement between Spain's ruling Socialists and other political parties over controlling public spending is 
possible, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero said on Tuesday (R). 
-5.01 0.64 
23.09.2011 Spain approved the sale of a stake in state-owned lottery operator Loterias y Apuestas del Estado on Friday, 
leaving what will be the country's biggest initial public offering on track despite tough markets and political 
opposition. While revenue from privatisation sales cannot be used to reduce a European country's annual 
public deficit under EU rules, the proceeds will mean Spain has to issue less debt (R). 
-4.33 7.14 
14.11.2011 Spain's borrowing costs risk hitting euro-era highs at auction this week, fuelling fears it is getting dragged back 
into the heart of the euro zone debt crisis as markets await evidence of a new government's commitment to 
economic reform (R). 
6.07 9.07 
03.01.2012 Registered unemployment in Spain, where almost half of young people are out of work, rose for a fifth month 
in December as the euro area’s fourth-largest economy contracted. The number of people registering for 
unemployment benefits rose 1,897 to 4.42 million, the Labor Ministry in Madrid said in an e-mailed statement 
today (B). 
5.85 6.45 
04.01.2012 The heavily indebted Spanish region of Valencia delayed a 123 million euro repayment to Deutsche Bank by a 
week, its deputy chief minister said, but did not call on the country's government to guarantee the funds. 
Ratings agency Fitch said in December it believed the government would step in to help Valencia if it faced 
problems (R).  
4.81 7.17 
02.03.2012 Spain set itself a softer deficit target for 2012 than originally agreed under the euro zone's austerity drive, 
putting a question mark over the credibility of the European Union's new fiscal pact (R).  
4.65 4.86 
27.03.2012 Spain’s economy is suffering its second recession since 2009, the Bank of Spain said today, a development that 
obstructs the government’s efforts to reorder public finances as it prepares the budget for this year (B). 
5.42 - 0.01 
18.06.2012 Spanish bond yields hit a new euro-era high above 7 percent on Monday as initial relief after a pro-bailout vote 
in Greek elections gave way to pessimism about the problems surrounding the bigger Spanish economy (R). 
4.29 3.76 
09.07.2012 European ministers were set to grant Spain an extra year to reach its deficit targets in exchange for further 
budget savings but remained far from pinning down details of bank rescues and emergency bond-buying that 
are of greater concern to markets. Spain faces budget risks despite the looser target (R). 
5.59 2.38 
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(Cont.) 
Date News Description Residual (%) ∆CDS (%) 
Panel B: Post-announcement (July 26, 2012 to July 26, 2013)    
30.08.2012 Spanish consumer prices surged in August driven by higher fuel costs and a value-added tax hike in September 
could drive another jump, complicating Spain's efforts to get out of recession and generate the growth needed 
to reduce its debts (R). 
6.87 3.03 
17.09.2012 Ten-year Spanish government bond yields extended their rise on Monday, driven by pressure ahead of this 
week's auctions and lingering doubts over when, or if, Spain will seek financial aid (R). 
3.40 1.87 
18.09.2012 Spain will consider seeking a bailout if the conditions imposed are acceptable, Deputy Prime Minister Soraya 
Saenz de Santamaria said as loan defaults at Spanish banks climbed and lending dropped (B). 
5.10 5.52 
17.10.2012 Spanish government bond yields fell to their lowest since early April on Wednesday after Moody's kept Spain's 
investment grade rating, removing an immediate threat to the euro zone's fourth largest economy (R). 
- 5.11 - 16.81 
18.10.2012 Spain’s banks face more loan losses as the pace of an economic slump risks turning a worst-case scenario 
dismissed in stress tests into reality, according to data published by the Bank of Spain on its website today (R). 
4.09 2.63 
22.10.2012 Spanish bonds fell for a second day on speculation Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s regional election victory 
gives him more room to delay seeking a bailout that would allow Europe’s central bank to buy the nation’s 
debt (B). 
6.28 3.70 
23.10.2012 The Bank of Spain said on Tuesday that Spain was at risk of missing its 2012 budget deficit target of 6.3 percent 
of GDP, including regions and social security, as a prolonged recession slashes revenues (R). 
3.98 5.68 
04.02.2013 Ten-year Spanish government bond yields rose on Monday as the country's opposition party called for the 
resignation of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy over a corruption scandal (R).  
3.94 6.07 
26.02.2013 Spain is no closer to seeking bond-buying help from the European Central Bank than it was before Italy's 
election, which has triggered renewed market turmoil, Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said on Tuesday (R). 
3.76 7.92 
22.07.2013 Spain's Prime Minister on Monday said he would soon appear in Parliament to face questions over a corruption 
scandal that has dented his ruling People's Party's credibility and upset Spaniards as they go through deep cuts 
in social welfare (R). 
3.55 - 2.16 
Notes: The news source is Reuters (R), or Bloomberg Businessweek (B). The residuals shown in the penultimate column, obtained by OLS estimation of the CAPM 
equation (1), are a proxy for the salience of the Spain-specific news on the corresponding days listed in the first column. The last column reports the actual daily 
change in the Spanish CDS spread. The spreads (and residuals) are expressed in percentage points. 
33 
 
Table 5. Spain-specific news effects on Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads 
Panel A: Pre-announcement (July 26, 2011 to July 25, 2012) 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **1.137 
(0.085) 
**0.751 
(0.067) 
**1.141 
(0.069) 
**0.938 
(0.072) 
**0.822 
(0.081) 
**0.628 
(0.092) 
**1.107 
(0.086) 
**0.850 
(0.125) 
**0.973 
(0.085) 
**0.616 
(0.090) 
Financial
- 
*0.107 
(0.045) 
- 
0.036 
(0.044) 
- 
**0.110 
(0.039) 
- 
**0.107 
(0.038) 
- 
0.077 
(0.048) 
Global
- 
**1.485 
(0.097) 
- 
**1.239 
(0.076) 
- 
**0.965 
(0.077) 
- 
**1.289 
(0.083) 
- 
**1.312 
(0.092) ߙ଴ 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ 0.219 
(0.184) 
**0.432 
(0.099) 
**0.404 
(0.097) 
**0.506 
(0.118) 
-0.086 
(0.178) 
0.210 
(0.138) 
0.207 
(0.134) 
*0.281 
(0.120) 
-0.148 
(0.165) 
0.011 
(0.101) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.57 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.45 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.52 0.63 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.612 
(0.050) 
**0.636  
(0.063) 
**1.236 
(0.054) 
**1.190  
(0.097) 
**0.951 
(0.072) 
**0.676 
(0.080) 
**0.681 
(0.064) 
**0.736  
(0.078) 
Financial
- 
0.039  
(0.026) 
- 
**0.089  
(0.030) 
- 
0.104 
(0.055) 
- 
-0.043  
(0.041) 
Global
- 
**0.544  
(0.075) 
- 
**1.098  
(0.081) 
- 
**1.186 
(0.090) 
- 
**0.607  
(0.098) ߙ଴ -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ *-0.547 
(0.229) 
*-0.544  
(0.240) 
**0.566 
(0.137) 
**0.562  
(0.122) 
0.086 
(0.163) 
0.225 
(0.135) 
*-0.410 
(0.175) 
**-0.561  
(0.171) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.47 0.48 0.72 0.73 0.50 0.57 0.40 0.41 
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(Cont.) 
Panel B: Post-announcement (July 26, 2012 to July 26, 2013) 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.735 
(0.078) 
**0.643 
(0.091) 
**0.870 
(0.106) 
**0.734 
(0.117) 
**0.502 
(0.091) 
**0.449 
(0.108) 
**0.845 
(0.107) 
**0.794 
(0.123) 
**0.726 
(0.127) 
**0.624 
(0.138) 
Financial
- 
-0.006 
(0.046) 
- 
-0.033 
(0.039) 
- 
-0.034 
(0.050) 
- 
-0.037 
(0.037) 
- 
-0.015 
(0.042) 
Global
- 
**0.720 
(0.095) 
- 
**0.895 
(0.079) 
- 
**0.472 
(0.086) 
- 
**0.718 
(0.092) 
- 
**0.730 
(0.146) ߙ଴ *-0.003 
(0.001) 
**-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
**-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
**-0.003 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ -0.058 
(0.117) 
-0.070 
(0.126) 
-0.107 
(0.281) 
-0.113 
(0.293) 
*-0.236 
(0.118) 
-0.236 
(0.135) 
-0.158 
(0.281) 
-0.137 
(0.316) 
-0.273 
(0.380) 
-0.281 
(0.411) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.46 0.26 0.27 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.700 
(0.099) 
**0.665  
(0.113) 
**1.096 
(0.088) 
**1.089  
(0.107) 
**0.627 
(0.098) 
**0.588 
(0.117) 
**0.846 
(0.138) 
**0.771  
(0.143) 
Financial
- 
-0.006  
(0.045) 
- 
0.065  
(0.048) 
- 
-0.059 
(0.031) 
- 
**0.171  
(0.053) 
Global
- 
**0.593  
(0.105) 
- 
**0.811  
(0.067) 
- 
**0.538 
(0.073) 
- 
**0.779  
(0.108) ߙ଴ *-0.003 
(0.001) 
**-0.005 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ 0.054 
(0.177) 
0.075 
(0.206) 
-0.115 
(0.683) 
-0.144  
(0.722) 
-0.142 
(0.241) 
-0.105 
(0.265) 
-0.288 
(0.283) 
-0.423  
(0.284) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.36 
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimation of the CAPM benchmark, equation (2), which controls for European sovereign risk, and the APT benchmark, equation (5), which 
additionally controls for global sovereign risk and European financial risk. The main parameter of interest is ࢻ૚ that measures the impact of Spanish-specific (predominantly 
bad) news. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels. 
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Table 6. Spain-specific news effects on non-Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads 
Pre-announcement: 26.07.2011 – 25.07.2012 
 Denmark Norway United Kingdom Sweden 
 CAPM CAPM CAPM CAPM 
European **0.988 
(0.071) 
**0.691 
(0.095) 
**0.758 
(0.058) 
**0.935 
(0.091) ߙ଴ 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ -0.136 
(0.117) 
0.245 
(0.268) 
-0.076 
(0.102) 
*-0.239  
(0.096) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.48 0.25 0.50 0.33 
Post-announcement: 26.07.2012 – 25.07.2013 
 Denmark Norway United Kingdom Sweden 
 CAPM CAPM CAPM CAPM 
European **0.470 
(0.097) 
**0.554 
(0.107) 
**0.421 
(0.075) 
**0.491 
(0.085) ߙ଴ **-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
News ሺࢻ૚ሻ -0.157 
(0.250) 
-0.128 
(0.135) 
-0.182 
(0.256) 
0.068 
(0.217) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.21  0.24 0.20 0.16 
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimation of the CAPM benchmark, equation (2), which controls for European sovereign risk, for 4 stand-alone European countries: 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The parameter of interest is ࢻ૚ that measures the impact of Spanish-specific (predominantly bad) news. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7. Spanish-specific news effects over 6-month windows 
 Pre-announcement  
26.01.2011 – 25.07.2012 
Post-announcement 
26.07.2012 – 25.01.2013 
 
CAPM APT CAPM APT 
Austria **0.354 
(0.124) 
**0.299 
(0.109) 
0.023 
(0.133) 
-0.023 
(0.134) 
Belgium **0.472 
(0.106) 
**0.447 
(0.112) 
0.029 
(0.375) 
0.063 
(0.376) 
Finland 0.521 
(0.324) 
0.445 
(0.379) 
-0.121 
(0.142) 
-0.054 
(0.142) 
France **0.563 
(0.214) 
*0.526 
(0.220) 
0.143 
(0.227) 
0.250 
(0.271) 
Germany 0.224 
(0.207) 
0.140 
(0.170) 
-0.106 
(0.414) 
-0.025 
(0.428) 
Ireland *-1.031 
(0.481) 
-0.939 
(0.494) 
0.062 
(0.202) 
0.155 
(0.240) 
Italy **0.536 
(0.130) 
**0.459 
(0.076) 
-0.733 
(0.905) 
-0.820 
(1.010) 
Netherlands **0.630 
(0.214) 
**0.560 
(0.197) 
-0.084 
(0.309) 
0.008 
(0.321) 
Portugal *-0.462 
(0.231) 
-0.448 
(0.249) 
-0.044 
(0.220) 
-0.305 
(0.229) 
Notes: The table repeats the analysis of Spain-specific news based on news identification over shorter 6-month 
windows around the implicit OMT announcement. In each window only the five days of most salient news are 
considered in the construction of ܰ݁ݓݏ௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡. The table reports the OLS estimate of the coefficient of the Spanish-
news variable (ߙଵ) in the CAPM equation (2) which controls only for European sovereign risk, and the APT 
equation (5) that additionally controls for global sovereign risk and European financial risk. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * denote significant 
coefficients at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
